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THE RACE IS ON! REGULATING SELFDRIVING VEHICLES BEFORE THEY HIT THE
STREETS
ABSTRACT
As the world braces itself for the unveiling of autonomous vehicles, the
idea of regulation and oversight has gone largely undetected. Though some
states have already begun enacting legislation ahead of the technology’s
wide release, the regulatory landscape across the country is in disarray. It is
imperative that both manufacturers and consumers be given some sort of
uniform understanding as to how the automation is overseen throughout the
manufacturing process and how liability will be levied in the case of
inevitable mistakes on our nation’s roadways. This Note proposes that the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration be responsible for providing
a fundamental regulatory framework that each state can thereafter build
upon as they see fit.
INTRODUCTION
The race to manufacture, market, and ultimately sell the first autonomous
vehicle (AV) is well underway. 1 In addition to technological powerhouse,
Alphabet’s Google, 2 auto manufacturers such as Volvo, Mercedes Benz, and
several others have also devoted time, money, and man-power in hopes of
becoming the first to develop safe, ready-to-use vehicles that operate free of
human intervention. 3 Over the past decade, the auto manufacturing industry
has seen a rising number of global companies, with ranging backgrounds and
specialties beyond the automotive industry, throw their hats into the growing
AV ring. 4 Though the legal infrastructure pertaining to the use and
manufacture of AVs is largely absent, it is imperative that a well-equipped
commission is established and assigned the responsibility of creating a strict
set of rules that regulate AVs before the unknown materially postpones the
unveiling of the next wave of technological change. 5
This Note magnifies the major developments that will soon change the
way in which we travel, or better yet, live our lives in the not-so-distant
future. More specifically, this Note will elaborate on the automotive

1. See Claire Cain Miller, When Driverless Cars Break the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/upshot/when-driverless-cars-break-the-law.html.
2. See Mark Harris, Why You Shouldn’t Worry About Liability for Self-Driving Car
Accidents, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 12, 2015), https://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transporta
tion/self-driving/why-you-shouldnt-worry-about-liability-for-selfdriving-car-accidents.
3. See id.
4. See Richard A. Walawender, A Look at Legal Issues for Autonomous Vehicles, MICH. L.
WKLY. (Mar. 17, 2016), https://milawyersweekly.com/news/2016/03/17/a-look-at-legal-issues-for
-autonomous-vehicles/.
5. See id.
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industry’s current state as it anticipates the approaching arrival of AVs as
well as the public’s need for AVs.
Part I will provide statistical information about “standard” auto
manufacturing, emphasizing its importance to our nation’s economy and job
force, and introduce the basic legal infrastructure pertaining to automobiles.
Part II will focus on the nationwide craze surrounding AVs by explaining the
numerous benefits, as well as some of the basic disadvantages that AVs may
pose to our society. In doing so, the underlying problem will appear—the
lack of uniformity among states regarding legal principles as they relate to
the future of transportation. The first major issue addressed is the absent legal
framework regarding AVs prior to their wide release, followed by a more
procedural concern pertaining to the insufficient process in which AVs are
currently overseen and certified before they grace our roadways. Part III puts
the onus on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
as the most suitable candidate to devise a basic legal framework pertaining
to the use and certification of AVs that can thereafter be built upon by the
states on a more individualized, case-by-case basis. Part IV looks to other
governmental agencies for assistance and guidance as to how they have dealt
with increased technology and science in their individual sectors. Lastly, Part
V provides several suggestions that NHTSA should consider in regulating
AVs, some of which are along the same lines of those implemented by the
other government agencies.
I. THE MODERN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
The automotive industry, excluding AVs, is largely dominated by three
major manufacturers—Toyota Motor Company, Volkswagen AG, and
General Motors. 6 Though General Motors once reigned supreme, 7 Toyota
Motor Company has been the leading auto manufacturer worldwide since
2012. 8 Aside from the dip in numbers experienced by each of the three
manufacturers from 2014 to 2015, Toyota still manufactured more than 10
million automobiles in the 2015 fiscal year. 9 The brief plunge is primarily
attributed to the substantially more costly changes currently administered to
“smart” cars with new and enhanced functions such as self-braking, selfparking, and automatic cruise control coupled with the widely-anticipated
release of completely autonomous vehicles within the next couple of years. 10
Although the benefits of AVs as opposed to human-operated vehicles appear
6. See Bertel Schmitt, Nice Try VW: Toyota Again World’s Largest Automaker, FORBES
(Jan. 27, 2016, 2:11 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bertelschmitt/2016/01/27/nice-try-vwtoyota-again-worlds-largest-automaker/#3eb527e52b65.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. See Evan Hirsch et al., 2016 Auto Industry Trends, S T R A T E G Y & ( M a r . 1 5 , 2 0 1 6 ) ,
https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/2016-auto-industry-trends.
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obvious and endless, the legal framework currently in place is not as clearcut.
A. DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT AUTOMOBILES
Even accounting for the dip in production as stated above, the American
automotive consumer market set a sale record of just under 17.5 million
vehicles sold in 2015. 11 This total represents an astounding 5.7% increase
from 2014, just topping the previous mark set in 2000 of 17,402,486 vehicles
sold. 12 The demand for the next best automobile is evidenced by society’s
willingness to spend its hard-earned money on the industry’s most
technologically advanced product. 13 However, the increase in the sale of cars
also represents an increase in accidents; the deaths per 100 million vehicle
miles traveled increased by a staggering .05% in 2015. 14 This complex
statistic translates to more than one million injuries and over 30,000 deaths
on our roads annually. 15 Of that number, human error is the leading cause of
injury and death, accounting for approximately 95% of accidents, followed
by weather and road conditions representing a mere 2.5%, and technical
failure also representing around 2.5%. 16 Considering society’s obsession
with the fastest, flashiest, and most technologically advanced vehicles,
manufacturers and technology companies are hoping that AVs will buck the
trend in this unfortunate statistic and remove human error from the road
altogether. 17
Aside from reducing the accident and death toll, traffic congestion also
proves to be a major driving force behind the development of AVs. 18 An early
2018 article references a statistic that Americans spend a total of 14.5 million
hours stuck in traffic each day. 19 This unfathomable total is largely due to the
fact that since 1970, “[t]he number of registered vehicles has grown by 90
percent . . . [h]owever, [t]otal number of road miles has grown by only 6

11.
12.
13.
14.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., EARLY
ESTIMATE OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES FOR THE FIRST HALF (JAN-JUN) OF 2015
(2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812217 [hereinafter EARLY
ESTIMATE OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES].
15. Alan D. Kaplan & Robert Sanzillo, Driverless Cars, L. J. N EW S L . (Aug. 2016), http
://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2016/08/01/driverless-cars/.
16. Dr. Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1145,
1149 (2012).
17. See id. at 1150 (citing to a statistic s h o w i n g that drivers are twenty times more likely
to get in a car accident while texting).
18. See Laurie Winkless, Just One Driverless Car Could Ease Traffic Jams, FORBES (May 26,
2017, 5:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lauriewinkless/2017/05/26/just-one-driverless-carcould-ease-traffic-jams/#5c16b711f9bf.
19. David Morgan, The Costs of Highway Congestion, ABC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2018), http://abcn
ews.go.com/US/story?id=94064&page=1.
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percent.” 20 The article also references the Texas Transportation Institute’s
Annual Mobility Report, which found that riders in the sixty-eight designated
urban areas spent more than $72 billion in “lost time and wasted fuel, or about
$755 annually per driver.” 21
In her May 2017 Forbes article, Laurie Winkless largely attributes
congestion to the fact that people naturally drive slower and more cautiously
when more cars are present. 22 With that said, she includes video footage of
the positive impact the lone AV has on the overall congested experimental
roadway. 23 The AV, unlike the nineteen human-operated cars, does not
decelerate when other cars are present, so “increasing the speed of the
autonomous vehicle further to 7m/s, dampens the traffic wave even further.
At a speed of 7.5 m/s, optimal dampening is achieved.” 24 Winkless concludes
that the experiment’s input of “one autonomous car reduces excessive
braking events from 8.58 per vehicle per km, to just 0.12/vehicle/km . . .
reduces fuel consumption by more than 40%,” and translates to an
approximate 14% increase in the average velocity of traffic on the road. 25
Therefore, the hope is that roadways dominated by AVs will only multiply
the positive impact evidenced by just one AV 26 and even assist in
harmonizing “traffic flow by controlling individual automobiles more
precisely through anticipation and inter-vehicle collaboration,” and thus
increase our overall fuel economy. 27
Today, young adults are typically driven to school by a parent or elder
licensed driver. 28 A 2014 NHTSA report found that young drivers 29
accounted for 5.5% of 214.1 million licensed drivers in the United States that
year, which represented a 7% decrease since 2005. 30 Governmental offices
in Washington D.C. have promoted carpooling among its employees, which
has resulted in about 16% of employees engaging in the practice. 31

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
See Winkless, supra note 18.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Beiker, supra note 1 6 , a t 1 0 5 0 – 5 1 .
See EARLY ESTIMATE OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES, supra note 14; see also
Kelly Clifton, Independent Mobility Among Teenagers: An Exploration of Travel to After-School
Activities 9 (Nov. 18, 2003) (unpublished graduate paper, University of Iowa), available at http://c
iteseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.603.9131&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
29. “Young driver” is defined as a person aged 15 to 20 operating a motor vehicle. NAT’L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., T R A FFIC S A FETY F AC TS : YOUNG DRIVERS (May 2016),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812278.
30. Id.
31. See Morgan, supra note 19.
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AV manufacturers are optimistic that the elimination of a human operator
will lead to an increase in mobility among all ages. 32 AVs will certainly
revitalize the lives of the elderly and disabled by providing a more accessible
and easier way to remain active, run daily errands, and maintain
relationships. 33
B. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Product liability law is the governing law pertaining to remedies of a
defective product, in this case a vehicle, that may cause damage or harm to a
person or property worthy of a remedy in the form of compensatory
damages. 34 Injured parties commonly cite to various legal theories to
maximize odds of prevailing on a claim and subsequently obtaining a
monetary award. 35 In a multi-billion-dollar industry like that of the car
manufacturing business, a claimant who settles with a company can walk
away with enough wealth for a lifetime. 36 For the purposes of this Note, the
discussed legal theories on which such a claimant may proceed include
negligent product design and manufacturing, and strict liability.
A successful negligence claim holds a product manufacturer liable for
failing to exercise a duty of reasonable care in the manufacture and design of
such product so that the product will remain safe when used in reasonably
foreseeable ways. 37 Though governed by state tort law, the elements of a
negligence claim are largely universal: “the existence of a legal duty; breach
of that duty; a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
plaintiff’s injury; and damages.” 38 Negligent manufacturing is slightly more
complex, in that the complainant must prove that the defendant’s negligence
resulted in a defect in the product that existed prior to leaving the
manufacturer. 39 But, in the case of a driverless vehicle and the unfortunate,
yet inevitable, occurrence of a crash, who is liable? The vehicle’s owner or
manufacturer? Questions and concerns continue to pollute the optimism and
hope for AVs.
32. See Press Release, RAND Corp., Self-Driving Vehicles Offer Potential Benefits, Policy
Challenges for Lawmakers (Jan. 6, 2014), available at http://www.rand.org/news/press/2014/01/
06.html [hereinafter RAND Corp. Press Release].
33. See Beiker, supra note 16, at 1151.
34. See generally JOHN VILLASENOR, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND DRIVERLESS CARS: ISSUES
AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR LEGISLATION 7 (Apr. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-conten
t/uploads/2016/06/Products_Liability_and_Driverless_Cars.pdf.
35. See id.
36. See id.; see also Jaclyn Trop, Toyota Seeks a Settlement for Sudden Acceleration Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/business/toyota-seeks-settleme
nt-for-lawsuits.html.
37. See VILLASENOR, supra note 34, at 7.
38. In re Toyota Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
978 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Seymour Elec. & Air Conditioning v. Statom,
710 S.E.2d 874 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)).
39. See id.
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Car manufacturers are most commonly deemed liable under the theory
of products liability. 40 Under this theory, manufacturers are liable when their
products cause or worsen the accident. 41 Courts commonly rely on the
Second Restatement of Torts in assigning liability for damages to those
sellers “engaged in the business of selling such a product” when their product
is sold in a defective condition deemed unreasonably dangerous to the
consumer. 42 Characterized as strictly liable, products liability law imposes
accountability on the manufacturers even if they had neither the “intention”
nor the “knowledge” that the vehicle produced had a potentially fatal defect.43
Manufacturers, however, are not liable for any damage caused by a vehicle
that was subsequently altered in any way after leaving the manufacturer’s
possession. 44 To prevail against a manufacturer with a claim, the aggrieved
consumer must succeed in proving that the vehicle was “unreasonably
dangerous,” which means that it was “dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.” 45
In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., the driver-decedent, traveling with 13year-old Richard Grimshaw, was fatally burned after her Ford Motor
Company (“Ford”) Pinto came to a sudden halt on a highway, was struck
from behind by a braking vehicle, and immediately engulfed in flames. 46 The
six-month old Ford Pinto had only endured 3,000 miles, yet had experienced
nothing but problems. 47 The Court deemed that the Ford Pinto was poorly
designed in that it allocated far less “crush space” than any other vehicle on
the road and, upon impact from behind, the exposed flange and bolts
punctured and pressed the gas tank forward. 48 One high-ranking Ford official
testified that “the highest level of Ford’s management made the decision to
go forward with the production of the Pinto, knowing that the gas tank was
vulnerable to puncture . . . creating a significant risk of death or injury from
fire and knowing that ‘fixes’ were feasible at nominal cost.” 49 Based on this
fact, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s holding that
Ford was liable for defective design even if the manufacturer had taken
reasonable precautions to design a safe product, because such precautions
“will not preclude the imposition of liability under strict liability principles,
40. See generally VILLASENOR, supra note 34.
41. Automotive Product Liability, YOUR LEGAL GUIDE, http://www.yourlegalguide.com/autom

otive-product-liability/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
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if, upon hindsight, the trier of fact concludes that the product’s design is
unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders.” 50
Common examples of automotive products liability cases include:
defective tires, defective airbags, defective seatbelts, and defective door
latches, among many others.51 Among its many objectives, NHTSA is
assigned with setting safety standards of new vehicles, the ability to recall
any defective vehicles and/or parts, and demand corrective action. 52 In
Grimshaw, Ford was liable for the Pinto’s poor design, specifically, of the
carburetor that caused the car to come to a sudden halt on the busy highway. 53
Second, Ford’s placement of the fuel tank directly behind the rear axle
enabled the bolts to puncture the tank, even in a low-speed, rear-ended crash,
and catch fire. 54 Also, top-ranking Ford executives approved each design
decision of the “unreasonably dangerous” vehicle that contradicted a driver’s
reasonable expectations of not coming to a sudden stop and bursting into
flames upon a rear-ended bump. 55 Shortly thereafter, NHTSA recalled the
Ford Pinto fleet of vehicles, as well as levied punitive damages on the car
manufacturer for its decision to opt for a cheaper option at the expense of
innocent lives. 56
Relating back to the absent regulation concerning AVs, manufacturers
are not provided a blueprint or way to assess when an AV is “unreasonably
dangerous” for the roadways and therefore unfit for the public’s use. On the
other hand, however, NHTSA and the Grimshaw court were equipped with
the necessary tools to conclude that Ford’s decision to design and
manufacture the Ford Pinto accordingly exceeded the “unreasonably
dangerous” threshold and was deemed inadequate and unsafe for consumer
use and therefore warranted the line’s recall and a hefty fine. 57
II. WHAT IS AN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE?
In 2010, Google boasted about its convoy of Toyota Priuses that had
operated free of a human operator for 140,000 miles. 58 Fast forward seven
plus years, AV technology has consumed the automotive industry and the
minds of drooling consumers. 59 Today, in the early part of 2018, futuristic
50. Id. at 378.
51. See Automotive Product Liability, YOUR LEGAL GUIDE, http://www.yourlegalguide.com/au

tomotive-product-liability/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2016).
52. See id.
53. See id.; see also Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
54. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 379; see also Automotive Product Liability, supra note 51.
55. Automotive Product Liability, supra note 51.
56. See id.
57. See id.; see also Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
58. See Larry Webster, The Age of the Car That Drives Itself, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct.
18, 2010), http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a6240/the-age-of-the-car-that-drives-itself/.
59. See Nathan A. Greenblatt, Self-Driving Cars Will Be Ready Before Our Laws Are, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Jan. 19, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/transportation/advanced-cars/selfdriving-cars
-will-be-ready-before-our-laws-are.
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mechanisms and automobile functions assisting drivers behind the wheel are
no longer rarities, but instead quite commonplace. 60 For instance, automated
parallel parking is a common function that has been implemented into
vehicles for the past decade, yet still requires “cooperation between a driver,
who maintains control over the brake and accelerator, and the parking
system, which takes over steering control as the vehicle is maneuvered into
a parking space.” 61 Though the optimism and buzz surrounding AVs are
palpable, particularly across Silicon Valley, the rest of us are left
predominantly in the dark until the vehicles are displayed on the showroom
floors and available for purchase. 62 Though the average consumer is unaware
of the many intricacies of AV automation and regulation, critics, skeptics,
knowledgeable consumers, and the like have voiced concern over the large
emptiness that is AV directives for some time. 63 However, this absence is
still present and becomes only more problematic as AV automation races
closer. 64
A. BENEFITS OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
The potential benefits of autonomous, self-driving vehicles are infinite. 65
Most obvious, manufacturers and consumers alike anticipate that the future
of AVs will bring safer roads and fewer casualties by providing an alternative
to human operation. 66 Charles Rattray of the Australian company, Energy
Queensland, has already set his sights on the year 2030 to release his own
AV concept—the “Autonomo.” 67 Most fascinating about the “Autonomo”
concept is the computer-wiring that enables AVs to communicate between
each other. 68 This wiring is intended to program AVs to travel in packs
depending on the AVs’ destination, largely inspired by the principle of
“swarm robotics,” whereby AVs would travel in “clusters that shift their
configurations to maintain an uninterrupted flow of traffic while allowing
particular vehicles to reach their respective destinations.” 69 The perceived
benefit is that AV self-organization will reduce the energy output and

60. See generally VILLASENOR, supra note 34.
61. Id. at 5.
62. See Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Autonomous Cars, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2013), https://w

ww.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-ethics-of-autonomous-cars/280360/.
63. See id.
64. News Release, Nev. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Regulations Clear the Road for Self-Driving
Cars (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.dmvnv.com/news/12001-regulations-for-self-driving
-cars.htm [hereinafter Nev. DMV News Release].
65. See Webster, supra note 58.
66. See Greenblatt, supra note 59.
67. See Jan Belezina, Autonomo—Fully Autonomous Vehicle Designed for the Year 2030,
NEW ATLAS (Nov. 26, 2011), https://newatlas.com/autonomo-fully-autonomous-vehicle-desig
ned-for-the-year-2030/20529/.
68. See id.
69. Id.
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highway traffic volume, all while diminishing the fatality and injury rates on
roads. 70
B. ANTICIPATED DISADVANTAGES OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Even though the idea of reducing the accident rate on our roads resulting
from texting and drunk-driving is encouraging, 71 it is also incomprehensible
that AVs will be able to assert the “good judgment” that people apply each
day on the road. 72 Drivers are commonly criticized for the boneheaded and
poor choices made behind the wheel, but the “good judgment” decisions
made by drivers in critical moments to avoid tragedy are very much
overlooked. 73 Among all the positive buzz concerning AV automation, the
technology is also met with a substantial degree of skepticism. 74 From a legal
standpoint, state regulation is largely behind the curve as it relates to the
development and testing of manufacturers’ AV technology. 75 Even some of
Google’s notes from their test-driven AVs honestly report the drastic highs
and lows for their own AV testing. 76 Though the public’s initial expectation
is largely positive, there are certainly many bumps in the road ahead.
From an unemployment perspective, the implementation of AVs in the
ride-sharing/taxi industry, largely dominated by Uber and Lyft, will eliminate
many jobs. 77 From the perspective of billion-dollar Silicon Valley-based taxi
service companies, they will no longer have to compensate drivers with a
certain percentage of the ride fare because they will have been replaced by
technology. 78 The stark decrease in the number of jobs in transportation will
translate to a great increase in the unemployment rate and will have a negative
impact on the overall economy. 79
Unfortunately, being driven by your car will not come cheap. 80 The
addition of “sensors, software, engineering and power and computing
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Winkless, supra note 18; see also Belezina, supra note 67.
See Greenblatt, supra note 59.
See Lin, supra note 62.
See id.
See generally RAND Corp. Press Release, supra note 32.
See Jan Belezina, Nevada Approves Regulations for Self-Driving Cars, NEW ATLAS (Feb.
17, 2012), http://newatlas.com/nevada-autonomous-car-regulations/21507/.
76. See GOOGLE SELF-DRIVING CAR PROJECT MONTHLY REPORT (Aug. 2016), https://static.go
ogleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//selfdrivingcar/files/reports/report-0816.pdf.
77. See Johana Bhuiyan, Why Uber Has to Be First to Market with Self-Driving Cars,
RECODE (Sep. 29, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.recode.net/2016/9/29/12946994/why-uber-hasto-be-first-to-market-with-self-driving-cars.
78. See id.
79. Top 20 Pros and Cons Associated with Self-Driving Cars, AUTO INS. CTR., http://www
.autoinsurancecenter.com/top-20-pros-and-cons-associated-with-self-driving-cars.htm
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Pros and Cons Associated with Self-Driving Cars].
80. See Study: Self-Driving Cars Would Eliminate Majority of Traffic Deaths, Congestion,
CBS DC (Oct. 23, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/10/23/study-self-drivi
ng-cars-would-eliminate-majority-of-traffic-deaths-congestion/ [hereinafter Self-Driving Cars
Would Eliminate Majority of Traffic Deaths].
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requirements” already exceed $100,000 per vehicle. 81 Compared to the
average transaction price for a light vehicle in the United States of $33,666
as of March 2016, self-driving cars are expected to surpass that average
considerably. 82 Though the $100,000 mark has been promised to decrease
over time with large-scale production, it will undoubtedly take time before
AVs rival the affordable pricing of standard vehicles. 83
The software necessary to operate AVs will require a great amount of
stored personal information. 84 Imagine the fear and reluctance of people
when asked to store personal and other important information in a computer
that they know very little about.85 People are unaware that AVs intended to
use “machine-to-machine communication” to ensure safety, which requires
the implementation of “a million applications,” making consumers and their
personal information a vulnerable target to hackers.86 Eddie Schwartz, Vice
President of Global Security Solutions for Verizon’s enterprise subsidiary,
explains that self-driving vehicles will operate by negotiating and exchanging
signals with each other. 87 This, Schwartz says, is intriguing to software
hackers. 88 People are very much unaware of the security threats their devices
currently pose, and Schwartz warns that with the advent of AVs and “the
growth of new devices and services in the health space the potential for
malicious hacks will grow exponentially, including devices that gather
intimate personal medical data.” 89
As for the legal perspective, there is no case law or precedent concerning
AVs. 90 Even in a world where people no longer operate their vehicles but
rather vest the responsibility in a software system, accidents are inevitable. 91
Currently, our legal system has yet to take a position as to who is responsible
for such accidents. Is it the driver? The deep-pocketed car manufacturer?
How about the software developer? Unlike the clear legal ramifications that
may result from car accidents today, the legislature has not yet solidified a
method or a standard of assigning liability when dealing with AVs. 92

81. Id.
82. See Press Release, Kelley Blue Book, New-Car Transaction Prices Up 2 Percent in March

2016, Along with Increases in Incentive Spend, According to Kelley Blue Book (Apr. 1, 2016),
available at http://mediaroom.kbb.com/new-car-transaction-prices-up-2-percent-march-2016.
83. See Self-Driving Cars Would Eliminate Majority of Traffic Deaths, supra note 80.
84. See Pros and Cons Associated with Self-Driving Cars, supra note 79.
85. See id.
86. Alex Hern, Self-Driving Cars Irresistible to Hackers, Warns Security Executive, T H E
GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2014, 5:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/28/sel
f-driving-cars-irresistible-hackers-security-executive.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See Pros and Cons Associated with Self-Driving Cars, supra note 79.
91. See id.
92. See RAND Corp. Press Release, supra note 32; see also Pros and Cons Associated with
Self-Driving Cars, supra note 79.
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C. PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
In 2016, Uber partnered with Volvo to unveil its first line of self-driving
cars in Pittsburgh. 93 Uber expects that self-driving taxis will double the
number of rides per hour that a human-operated taxi currently performs. 94
Also noteworthy, Uber enforces a 12-hour cap on its drivers’ workdays, for
safety concerns, that would no longer be levied on a software-controlled
vehicle. 95 Instead, self-driving taxis would become full-time, around-theclock employees as opposed to the 52% of Uber drivers that work on a parttime basis. 96 Implicit in these statistics and Uber’s plans is that the ridesharing service will no longer be splitting fares with its thousands of drivers
worldwide. 97 In order for Uber to hit these lofty expectations, it must continue
to invest billions of dollars in the revolutionary technology to come out ahead
of the global arms race even as regulation of these new machines continues
to loom overhead. 98
In March of 2018, news of the first fatality involving an AV shocked
consumers and manufacturers alike. 99 Just weeks after Arizona’s governor,
Doug Ducey, updated an executive order permitting the use of AVs on state
roads without an operator behind the wheel, an Uber SUV struck and killed
a pedestrian as the vehicle was going approximately 40 miles per hour in a
35-mile per hour zone. 100 Uber has since halted its AV testing in both the
United States and Canada. However, this is not the first time Uber has faced
turbulence—in 2017, Uber pulled its test vehicles from roads for a brief
period after an AV landed on its side. 101 While consumers salivate at the idea
of AVs and manufacturers salivate at the anticipated revenues, “skeptics have
pointed out that the industry is entering a dangerous phase while the cars are
not yet fully autonomous, but human operators are not fully engaged.” 102
As previously mentioned, NHTSA and now the Society of Automotive
Engineers have established a classification system for the varying types of
human control of vehicles, ranging from zero—complete human control—to

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See Bhuiyan, supra note 77.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Matt McFarland, Uber Self-Driving Car Kills Pedestrian in First Fatal Autonomous
Crash, CNN TECH (Mar. 19, 2018, 1:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/03/19/technology/uberautonomous-car-fatal-crash/index.html.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Sam Levin, Video Released of Uber Self-Driving Crash that Killed Woman in Arizona, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/22/vide
o-released-of-uber-self-driving-crash-that-killed-woman-in-arizona.
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five—free of any human intervention. 103 In its study, Kelley Blue Book found
that “consumer interest is currently greatest for Level 4 technology,” which
offers drivers complete vehicle autonomy with the option for human input. 104
The fact that AVs have not yet been released to consumers but are already
being polled and classified based on their levels of technological autonomy
highlights the immediate need for some sort of formal and uniform regulation
ahead of their use across the country.
D. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK CONCERNING AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLES
In 2011, Nevada became the first state to regulate the operation of AVs
on public roadways. 105 Since its initial acknowledgment of AV operation,
Nevada has enacted NRS 482A, groundbreaking legislation that allows for
the operation and testing of AVs. 106 In its news release announcing the
legislation, Nevada’s Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) boasted about
becoming the first state to “embrace” the future of automobiles and
transportation. 107 The state’s legislature originally defined an autonomous
vehicle as a “motor vehicle that uses artificial intelligence, sensors and a
global positioning system which coordinates to drive itself without the active
intervention of a human operator.” 108 The enactment empowered Nevada’s
DMV with the ability to implement regulations concerning the operation of
AVs on Nevada’s roads. 109
In 2013, New Jersey enacted similar legislation that required the state’s
Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC) to adopt regulations regarding AV
operation. 110 That same year, Arizona and Hawaii also enacted legislation
entrusting the role of regulation construction to their respective motor vehicle
departments. 111 Like some other states, the New Jersey legislation required
the MVC to impose geographical limitations on the testing of AVs.112 This
zoning requirement is particularly prevalent in more densely populated states
103. See Bob Nagy, KBB Study Finds American Drivers Still Prefer a Hands-On Approach,
KELLEY BLUE BOOK (Sept. 28, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://www.kbb.com/car-news/all-the-latest/
kbb-future-autonomous-vehicle-study-2016/2100001166/#survey.
104. Id.
105. See Nev. DMV News Release, supra note 64.
106. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.010–482A.200 (2011); see also Jon LeSage, Nevada
Grants First-Ever Autonomous Vehicle Driver’s License, HYBRID CARS (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://www.hybridcars.com/nevada-grants-first-ever-autonomous-vehicle-drivers-license/.
107. See Nev. DMV News Release, supra note 64.
108. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.030 (amended 2013). The statute now defines an “autonomous
vehicle” as “a motor vehicle that is equipped with autonomous technology.” Id.
109. See id.
110. See S. 2898, 215th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2013); see also Assemb. 3020, 215th Legis.,
1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012).
111. See H.B. 2167, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013); see also H.B. 1461, 27th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013).
112. See S. 2898, 215th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2013); see also Assemb. 3020, 215th Legis.,
1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2012).
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and areas that seek to ensure the safety of AV operation. 113 However, at such
a premature stage, testing is likely not committed on the more crowded
roadways. 114
Since Nevada’s groundbreaking legislation, many other states have
followed suit. 115 Nevada, however, largely remains the trailblazer in AV
regulation and has even allowed for the operation of AVs on public roads “so
long as a human driver is sitting behind the wheel on alert,” while other states
permit AV testing only on designated roadways. 116 In September 2016,
Nevada issued its first AV driver’s license to Sam Schmidt, a quadriplegic
since a high-speed collision in 2000. 117 Thanks to Arrow Electronics
technology, Schmidt operates a modified Corvette Z06, dubbed the “SAM,”
“using his voice, head, and breath to steer, accelerate, and brake.” 118 Since
Schmidt does not completely control the vehicle’s operation, the State of
Nevada qualifies the vehicle as “autonomous.” 119 Across the pond, however,
the European Union has yet to succumb to the thought of AV technology,
and its laws continue to require each driver to remain in full control of their
vehicle at all times. 120 Arizona’s amendment to an executive order in March
of 2018, which permits AV testing without human operators, only underlines
the double-edged sword, supporting the innovation of AVs versus expending
time and money to regulating such innovation beforehand, that may cause
some pushback from manufacturers. 121 Though the increasing number of
state regulation paves the way for the future of the automotive industry, there
is an alarming degree of contradiction between the current legal framework
among states concerning AV operation.
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE LEGAL PROBLEMS FACING THE
FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
The inevitable legal issue soon to address our Nation is how to assign
blame and liability once an AV, or even an AV manufacturer, commits a
113. See Andrew R. Swanson, Comment, “Somebody Grab the Wheel!”: State Autonomous
Vehicle Legislation and the Road to a National Regime, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 1085, 1103 (2014).
114. See id.
115. California, District of Columbia, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota,
Tennessee, and Utah have all enacted legislation in some capacity that concerns Autonomous
Vehicles. S e e Gabriel Weiner & Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative and
Regulatory Action, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Autom
ated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action (last updated Apr. 27, 2017, 1:48 PM).
116. Greenblatt, supra note 59.
117. See LeSage, supra note 106.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See Ellie Zolfagharifard, Tesla Battles Google in Race to Get Driverless Cars on the
Road: Elon Musk Says Company Will Produce Self-Driving Vehicles by 2015, DAILY MAIL
(Sept. 18, 2013, 6:29 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2424312/Teslas-El
on-Musk-says-self-driving-cars-produced-2016.html.
121. See McFarland, supra note 99.
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mistake. 122 Though Google has improved the accident rate of their AVs since
the inception of such programs, accidents are inevitable and will continue
even after human operation has been removed from the equation. 123 It is
imperative that this legal concern be sorted so that car manufacturers and
technological titans alike can continue to invest time and money with the
knowledge of when and how they may expose themselves to risk. 124 As
previously mentioned, the current legal framework is a hodgepodge of
regulations that differ from state to state with some states choosing to ignore
AV automation entirely. 125 The downside of conflicting regulatory
requirements is almost as catastrophic as having none at all since confusion
will also diminish from the countless benefits to be had from AV
technology. 126
While society sits back taking pleasure in the billion-dollar arms race,
Google, Uber and the like must be provided with some assurance of their
investments. 127 It would be ludicrous for society to expect companies to
expend billions of dollars on developing a technology that has not yet been
legalized. 128 The idea of supplanting our products liability law to the realm
of AVs would not only confuse individual litigants seeking actual
compensation but would also clog our judicial system with the multitude of
legal avenues available.129 The most obvious fear would arise in the
occurrence of a criminal case—how will our courts levy criminal punishment
on mere robots? 130
Many consumers fear that the imposition of strict laws on manufacturers
and technological software companies would only deter and impede the
process of creating AVs. 131 Regulation and legal accountability, however,
can not only provide guidelines to these conglomerates but also relieve a
manufacturer of a looming concern ahead of a product’s release.132 In a
product liability lawsuit, the outcome hinges on “whether the product had a
122. See Lin, supra note 62.
123. See Ashley Halsey III & Michael Laris, Self-Driving Cars Reach a Fork in the Road,

and Automakers Take Different Routes, WASH. P OST (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/self-driving-cars-reach-a-fork-in-the-road-andautomakers-take-different-routes/2016/08/24/5cdeaba8-63d9-11e6-8b27bb8ba39497a2_story.html?utm_term=.f1f35b120fe3.
124. See Lin, supra note 62.
125. See Autonomous Vehicles, Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGIS. (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-legislation
.aspx [hereinafter Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation].
126. See RAND Corp. Press Release, supra note 32.
127. See Greenblatt, supra note 59.
128. See id.
129. See Harris, supra note 2 (explaining that one can choose from a plethora of avenues to
hold a manufacturer liable, such as a negligence, strict liability doctrine, and design or
manufacturing defects).
130. See Miller, s u p r a n o t e 1 .
131. See Greenblatt, supra note 59.
132. See id.
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‘defective condition’ that was unreasonably dangerous,” which depends on
whether the product could have been made safer at an acceptable cost.133 How
are manufacturers of this futuristic technology supposed to gauge the
“reasonably safe” standard of AV technology? 134
An underlying issue in the tug-of-war between regulation and innovation
is the process by which AVs become certified and approved for the roadways
ahead of their debut. 135 Current AV procedures allow manufacturers to have
a considerable voice in deciding when their own technology is appropriate
for the public’s use. 136 During the creation of Arrow Electronics’ SAM, the
state gave great deference and latitude to Arrow Electronics in determining
how and when the AV was deemed ready for use in Nevada. 137 Though
Arrow conducted hundreds of miles of test runs, the company and Schmidt
worked together tirelessly in “Nevada for the state to revise regulations
allowing Schmidt to drive on roads in addition to race tracks.” 138
Collaborative work is certainly applauded, but there is something to be said
when the companies seeking to make money from AVs also have input and
influence as to how the technology is regulated.
A. CALLING ON THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION TO FIX THIS PROBLEM
There is currently no governmental agency charged with implementing
guidelines to ensure that AVs meet a pre-determined uniform national
standard of “fitness.” Even after the first AV fatality in Arizona in March
2018, local prosecutors have disagreed with the local police chief as to the
degree of liability to be levied against the ride-sharing conglomerate. 139
While some local prosecutors contend that Uber can be held criminally liable
if the AV is deemed to have negligently killed the pedestrian, local police
chief, Sylvia Moir, dismisses the notion of criminal charges. 140 With that
said, the following proposed solution is an attempt to combat the absent
uniform legal authority concerning AV technology that is far closer than one
may think. In a NHTSA report, the governmental agency acknowledges,
“there are few barriers for automated vehicles to comply with FMVSS
[Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards], as long as the vehicle does not
significantly diverge from a conventional vehicle design.” 141 Pursuant to its

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id.
See id.
See LeSage, supra note 106.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Levin, supra note 102.
See id.
ANITA KIM ET AL., REVIEW OF FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS)
FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLES viii (Mar. 2016), available at https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/12260.
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congressional power to set the baseline standard for automobiles in states, 142
so too should NHTSA be empowered with the ability to furnish the baseline
rules regarding AVs across the country. NHTSA undeniably has a great
understanding of our nation’s roadways and how to ensure the public’s
safety, and is therefore most fit to devise a uniform baseline standard that
would provide each state with at least some sort of immediate and effective
regulation. Putting more on the governmental agency’s plate is not unheard
of—in 2014, the Motor Vehicle Safety Enhancement Act was passed to
amend the national highway law to require NHTSA to implement programs:
“(vii) to reduce injuries and deaths to older drivers; (viii) to improve
emergency medical services response to crash sites.” 143 Though NHTSA may
be equipped with the many tools necessary to carry out this daunting task, it
will also need to look beyond just the automobile industry, where
revolutionary technology also took the respective government agencies by
surprise, forcing them to act swiftly.
B. NHTSA’S POWER ON DISPLAY
NHTSA was established under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 (NTMVSA) 144 and has since been appointed with
protecting people on our (sometimes dangerous) roadways. 145 Though many
of the safety measures had initially been met with skepticism, these
parameters are now widely recognized and second nature. 146 Since its first
enactment requiring any restraint in the seats of vehicles in 1968, NHTSA
has continued to amend and tinker the rules it deems necessary. 147 NHTSA
is amiable in that it seeks to improve glaring issues concerning our roads and
vehicles rather than impose baseless regulations and requirements. In
summation, the notion that AV regulation exceeds NHTSA’s capacity is
premature and unfounded.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., the Supreme Court explained that the requirements imposed
by NHTSA are subject to a rather low level of scrutiny—the “arbitrary-andcapricious” standard. 148 In Motor Vehicles Manufacturers, NHTSA’s effort
142. See 23 U.S.C. § 402 (2012).
143. See Motor Vehicle and Highway Safety Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 2760, 113th Cong.

(2016).
144. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat.
718.
145. The Act explicitly states that NHTSA should “reduce traffic accidents and death and
injuries to person resulting from traffic accidents.” Id.
146. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 49 C.F.R. §
571.208 (1971).
147. NHTSA has continuously made amendments to this legislation entitled “Occupant Crash
Protection.” See id.
148. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 54
(1983).
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to rescind its Standard No. 208 regulation in favor of a more demanding
constraint was denied even though the Court recognized that allowing
manufacturers to choose between the installation of passive restraints, like
airbags and seatbelts, was not a sufficient protective measure as supported by
persuasive statistics, and was therefore rendered “arbitrary and
capricious.” 149 Though the Court insisted that it may not substitute its own
judgment in place of NHTSA’s, the agency failed to procure sufficient
evidence to rescind the passive restraint requirement thus causing NHTSA to
reconsider the restraint issue entirely or amend the Standard to comply with
its supporting evidence. 150 Standard No. 208, which codified the
implementation of restraint in vehicles, was revolutionary and has since been
amended several times to more effectively protect passengers.151 The most
recent amendment required the testing of anthropomorphic dummies in
certain testing arrangements “of certain multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses,” that included both active and passive restraints. 152
Another example of NHTSA in action is Standard No. 114, which intends
to prevent theft and a vehicle’s rollaway. 153 Though it has been amended
since its debut in 1980, Standard No. 114 still requires that manufacturers of
passenger vehicles and trucks deactivate the engine’s normal functions and
steering ability once the key has been removed. 154 NHTSA explains that it
has the power to enact this imposition on manufacturers in a concerted effort
“to reduce the incidence of crashes resulting from theft and accidental
rollaway of motor vehicles.” 155
In 2013, NHTSA mandated a quirky regulation, originally filed as 78 FR
2798, which ordered certain vehicles to emit a sound to notify blind and
distracted pedestrians of the vehicle’s presence. 156 The alarm was required in
“EVs [electric vehicles] and to those HVs [hybrid vehicles] that are capable
of propulsion in any forward or reverse gear without the vehicle’s ICE
[internal combustion engine] operating.” 157 NHTSA, to prevent an accident
in a low-speed maneuver, observed that ICE vehicles emit a louder noise at
lower speeds than HVs and EVs, and also noticed that ICEs experience fewer
accidents at these speeds. 158 Recognizing the correlation between “sound of

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 46.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43.
See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.
See id. at S2–S3.
See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Theft Protection and Rollaway Prevention,
49 C.F.R. § 571.114 (1980).
154. See id. at S5.1.1.
155. See id.
156. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and
Electric Vehicles, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,416, 90,417 (Dec. 14, 2016) (codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 571,
585).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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vehicle” and “accident rate,” NHTSA sought to alert pedestrians that may not
otherwise notice a slowly approaching EV or HV.
Critics may claim that according to the Tenth Amendment, the roadways
are to be regulated by state governments under their implicit “state police
power.” 159 The Tenth Amendment does admittedly provide the states with a
power “not delegated to the United States,” including the ability to establish
and enforce laws that protect the welfare, safety, and health of the public.160
However, Congress’ NTMVSA of 1966 birthed NHTSA with the intention
of protecting the public by creating safer roadways across the country. 161
Since NHTSA is bequeathed with the broad power of ensuring safety on our
country’s roadways, 162 NHTSA is encouraged to tackle the great unknown of
AV technology in a manner consistent with the congressional power
bestowed upon it decades ago, thereby circumventing any notion that the
states have any superior claim to regulate in this regard.
IV. LOOKING TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR GUIDANCE
It would greatly behoove NHTSA to focus solely on the automobile
industry. AV automation is just an example of how heightened technology
attempts to transform an industry before the industry is prepared with the
necessary legal framework. With that said, NHTSA should look to the Food
and Drug Administration’s strict review process of the varying types of drugs
it oversees and how the Federal Aviation Administration dealt with the
staggering increase in drone use.
A. THE FDA’S DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is intended “to ensure that the
drugs marketed in the United States are safe and effective.” 163 The FDA’s
detailed and rigorous drug approval process expressed in the 1992
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) created a two-tier drug review
process to be applied depending on the type of drug under review. 164 The
“standard review” is a ten-month process, applied to a drug that offers, at
most, just a slight improvement in comparison to currently available drugs
and therapies. 165 The “priority review” process is applied to proposed drugs

159. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
160. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
161. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat.

718.

162. See id.
163. Frequently Asked Questions About the FDA Drug Approval Process, FDA, http://www.

fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/SpecialFeatures/ucm279676.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2017).
164. See id.
165. See id.
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that offer drastic improvements to existing treatments or prove a treatment
not currently available. 166
The FDA’s drug review process recently received major backlash when
Sarepta Therapeutics’ (Sarepta) proposed life-changing drug was delayed for
months. 167 Despite the drug’s proven wonders, outspoken support, and even
congressional support, the FDA remained adamant on subjecting it to its
routine rigorous approval process. 168 After the drug was finally approved,
opponents felt that the FDA and its Commissioner had become “far too
influenced by patient advocates and drug companies, and [had] allowed the
delicate balance in drug approvals to tilt toward speedy decisions.” 169 The
FDA’s time-consuming approval process was also on display when Sarepta
sought certification of its drug designed to cure muscular dystrophy. Though
the drug had provided data instances of its positive effect aiding those living
with the crippling disease, the drug remained subject to the strict process. 170
The idea is that if these potentially life-saving drugs are subject to such
a strict standard of review, so too should AV automation that does not even
have the ability to cure children of debilitating diseases. In addition, the
pharmaceutical and auto manufacturer industries are both comprised of
billion-dollar companies jostling for market share. 171 Though similar in some
respects, the FDA and NHTSA vary considerably. Among its many powers,
NHTSA oversees the manufacturing process of vehicles and determines what
is permitted on the roadways within the confines of its rules and guidelines. 172
The FDA, however, is tasked with reviewing studies and reports conducted
by drug manufacturers to aid in the approval determination of a proposed
drug. 173 In seeking the FDA’s stamp of approval, drug manufacturers can
choose from a variety of applications such as an Investigational New Drug,
New Drug Application (NDA), Abbreviated New Drug Application, and
Biological License Application, each requiring different research reports and
data to qualify for the benefits of that particular application. 174 For example,
the NDA requires that the “drug sponsor” submit “data from specific
166. See id.
167. See Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Approves Muscular Dystrophy Drug That Patients Lobbied

For, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/business/fda-approvesmuscular-dystrophy-drug-that-patients-lobbied-for.html.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See id.; see also Denise Grady, F.D.A. Panel Recommends Approval for Gene-Altering
Leukemia Treatment, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/health/
fda-novartis-leukemia-gene-medicine.html.
171. See Praveen Duddu, The Top 10 Biggest Pharmaceutical Companies of 2014,
PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/fe
aturethe-top-10-biggest-pharmaceutical-companies-of-2014-4396561/.
172. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat.
718.
173. See Frequently Asked Questions About the FDA Drug Approval Process, supra note
163.
174. See id.
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technical viewpoints for review, including chemistry, pharmacology,
medical, biopharmaceutics, and statistics” to market in the United States.175
NHTSA should take after the FDA’s imposed strict scrutiny of proposed
drugs and treatments sought to relieve patients of unbearable and lifethreatening illnesses in its own oversight of the manufacture and certification
of AV operation. In doing so, NHTSA should consider implementing
different standards of review for the varying AV uses or even based on the
different types of AV operators.
B. THE FAA’S DRONE REGULATIONS
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), established by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 176 recently passed regulation concerning small
unmanned aircrafts, otherwise known as “drones.” 177 Pursuant to the 1958
Act and the FAA’s purpose “to provide for the regulation and promotion of
civil aviation . . . and to provide for the safe and efficient use of the airspace
. . . ,” the FAA was the appropriate governing agency to oversee drone use. 178
In its press release announcing the drone regulations, the FAA
proclaimed that the regulations would open “pathways toward fully
integrating UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] into the nation’s airspace” and,
more specifically, that the regulations would “work to harness new
innovations safely, to spur job growth, advance critical scientific research
and save lives.” 179 Though drones continue to be released in all shapes and
sizes with varying primary uses, the FAA’s Part 107 regulations govern just
those drones weighing less than fifty-five pounds operating for commercial
use. 180
Among the changes by the FAA to the Part 107 regulations was the
addition of a knowledge test and the necessary certification instead of a
mandatory license by any operation. 181 This change prohibits operators less
than sixteen years of age from qualifying for the remote pilot certificate. 182
Also, remote pilot certificates must be renewed every two years by passing
175. Id.
176. See generally Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
177. See Press Release, FAA, DOT and FAA Finalize Rule for Small Unmanned Aircraft

Systems (June 21, 2016), available at https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cf
m?newsId=20515 [hereinafter FAA Press Release].
178. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
179. FAA Press Release, supra note 1 7 7 .
180. See id.
181. See Ben Popper, New FAA Rules Mean US Companies Can Fly Drones Without a Pilot’s
License, T H E VERGE (June 21, 2016, 10:11 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/21/1197830
8/new-faa-rules-mean-us-companies-can-fly-drones-without-a-pilots.
182. See Fact Sheet – Small Unmanned Aircraft Regulations (Part 107), FAA (June 21, 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=20516 [hereinafter FAA Fact
Sheet]; see also Bart Jansen, FAA Completes Landmark Rules for Commercial Drones, USA
TODAY (June 21, 2016, 7:10 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/06/21/faa-comme
rcial-drone-rules/85641170/.
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an aeronautics test. 183 Companies and operators have celebrated the new
certification as a “much cheaper, faster, and simpler path to getting in the air”
without removing operators from the equation. 184 As for Amazon’s goal of
delivering instantaneous deliveries to your doorstep by drones, Part 107 only
governs the use of drones by human operators, so the company’s dream of
technologically-operated drones like AV automation without human
oversight will have to wait a bit longer. 185 Part 107 also mandates that the
operator keep the drone within plain sight without the use of an aid like
binoculars or telescope. 186 Also, an operator is required to a conduct a
“preflight visual and operation check” before using the drone to confirm that
the safety-pertinent systems are functioning properly and that the
communication and transmittance between done and operator are active. 187
Since the FAA’s initial drone requisites in early 2015, the agency has
added new regulations as it continues to learn more about the commercial use
of drones nationwide. 188 Among the “newer” parameters, the FAA permits
the commercial use of drones only during daylight hours, that is, thirty
minutes before official sunrise to thirty minutes after official sunset.189 The
FAA has also barred any speed exceeding 100 miles per hour groundspeed
and drone operation greater than 400 feet above ground level. 190 The FAA
has also classified airspace by the area’s relation to mean sea level and flight
level to ensure that drone use is even more limited in sensitive and delicate
areas (for example, near airports or hospitals). 191
Many similarities between the FAA and NHTSA are rather uncanny. In
fact, Anthony Foxx, the secretary for the U.S. Department of Transportation,
has even attempted to mimic the successful regulations of the FAA and apply
it to NHTSA. 192 There is plenty that NHTSA can discern from the way the
FAA has handled commercial drone use. Drones remain a relatively recent
novelty and the FAA has been ready, willing, and able to adjust its guidelines
as it continues to learn more about the small aircrafts. 193 The FAA’s
classification of airspace and its application of heightened restrictions in
183. See FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 182; see also Jansen, supra note 182.
184. See Popper, supra note 1 8 1 .
185. See James Vincent, FAA Regulations for Commercial Drones Are Now in Effect, T H E

VERGE (Aug. 30, 2016 6:50 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/30/12707502/drone-regula
tions-legality-us-faa.
186. See id.
187. See FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 182.
188. See Vincent, supra note 185.
189. See FAA, SUMMARY OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT RULE (PART 107) (June 21, 2016),
available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf.
190. See id.
191. See Anthony, An Airspace Lesson for Drone Pilots, MULTIROTOR USA (Nov. 21, 2015),
http://www.multirotorusa.com/midair-collision-avoidance/.
192. See Brent Snavely, FAA and NHTSA Using Similar Regulatory Playbooks, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Feb. 13, 2016, 10:39 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/2016/02/13/fa
a-and-nhtsa-using-similar-regulatory-playbooks/79314200/.
193. See Jansen, supra note 1 8 2 .
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certain areas can be directly applied in the AV context. While airspace
classification ensures that drones do not interfere with airplanes and air traffic
control, the same can be said for AV use on congested roadways near
hospitals or high-security areas. On the other hand, the FAA’s imposition of
liability on drone operators would likely do little justice in the AV-context
where human operators or owners only sparingly control the vehicle. Most
importantly, the FAA noted that the operation of a drone is different than an
airplane and, therefore, necessitated its own distinct treatment, i.e., the
certification process as opposed to the previous pilot licensing
requirement. 194 For that reason, NHTSA should be encouraged to take a step
back and identify the differences between AV operation and the current use
of a motor vehicles to most effectively administer AV procedures.
V. PROPOSED GUIDELINES TO REGULATE AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLES
Both the FAA and FDA demonstrate bright spots that can be emulated
by NHTSA as it seeks to regulate a largely unknown animal—AVs. In the
Supreme Court’s assessment of Standard No. 208, it explains that agencies
must be given substantial latitude and freedom to “adapt their rules and
policies to the demands of changing circumstances,”195 which in this case is
the increasing knowledge and testing of AV technology. NHTSA is faced
with the challenge of implementing a middle ground between the imposition
of an overly strict, unchanging set of uniform rules versus granting each state
complete reign in the realm of AV automation to implement their own
varying regulations if, when, and how they see fit. Between these two
extreme ends of the spectrum, NHTSA has an infinite number of potential
regulations it can choose to execute. Therefore, it is critical that NHTSA
create a basic, uniform baseline of legal infrastructure without impeding on
the Tenth Amendment’s vesting each state with its own “police power.”
A. SUGGESTIONS FOR NHTSA
Firstly, the FAA’s elimination of the pilot license requirement instead of
a more specific process that requires each operator to pass a knowledge test
and obtain certification should be translated to AVs. 196 In addition, by
enforcing a two-year renewal policy on certification, AV owners remain upto-date on any innovation or studies concerning AV automation. Conversely,
the FAA’s policy that suggests each drone operator conduct a thorough check
prior to operation would be impractical to ask of each AV owner. NHTSA
must assign the responsibility of ensuring a safely-operated AV to the
194. See id.; see also Popper, supra note 181.
195. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
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manufacturers rather than to the vehicle’s owner. While an owner will be
unable to evade liability for operating an AV with blatant or obvious defects,
the more discrete and undetected technological malfunctions must be dealt
with by those that understand the wiring best—the manufacturers. Without
assigning liability to the manufacturers, they would largely escape AV
incidents unscathed.
Secondly, similar to the FDA’s detailed twelve-step drug certification
process, 197 NHTSA should also institute a lengthy supervised process of
development before AVs can be sold to the public. In this process, NHTSA
should require its own representatives to oversee the process and testing of
AV development, just as it has done for years with standard automotive
testing. 198 As it stands, AV manufacturers are largely unsupervised and only
adhere to the instruction of their superiors. 199 NHTSA must implement a
workplace code or standard of conduct to be upheld throughout the
development and manufacturing processes.
Finally, NHTSA should impose differing standards of review in the
certification process for varying AV uses—similar to how the FDA imposes
either a “standard” or “priority” standard of review based on a proposed
drug’s effect on industry and the several types of applications that can be
awarded. 200 NHTSA could consequently apply a different criteria of
certification for the common consumer that relies on AVs for basic
transportation and convenience, like Sam Schmidt, the quadriplegic from
Nevada who tested AVs for Arrow Electronics, who hopes to use the AV for
“necessity.” This is not to imply that an application for a “necessity” use
would be subject to a less detailed or exacting review, but rather a proposal
of different criteria for each of the uses that would enable NHTSA to grant
certifications in a more efficient manner.
B. FLAWS IN OTHER PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The discussion of legal complications of AV liability has been ongoing
since the idea of AVs first began to buzz, and there has been no shortage of
conflicting opinions on the subject. One columnist, Nathan Greenblatt, has
been adamant about leveling the playing field between AVs and humanoperated vehicles by advocating that the design defect laws do not pervade
into the AV universe. 201 Instead, Greenblatt proposes strictly applying
negligence as is applied in standard automotive incidents—”[t]hat is, a
197. See Frequently Asked Questions About the FDA Drug Approval Process, supra note 1 6 3 .
198. See Akweli Parker, How Car Testing Works, H O W S T U F F W O R K S , http://auto.howstu

ffworks.com/car-driving-safety/safety-regulatory-devices/car-testing.htm (last visited Dec. 18,
2016).
199. See Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, supra note 125.
200. See Frequently Asked Questions About the FDA Drug Approval Process, s u p r a n o t e
163.
201. See Greenblatt, supra note 59.
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computer driver should be held liable only if a human driver who took the
same actions in the same circumstances would be held liable.” 202
Greenblatt’s suggestion of copy-and-paste may supply an easy fix, but
over time, as issues regarding AVs become even more complex, the
framework needs amending to accommodate the changing technology.
Negligence largely requires the factfinder to identify the actor’s scienter. 203
The Second Restatement of Torts Section 283 explains that one can evade
liability under a negligence claim by acting in accordance with the
“reasonable man standard.” 204 Adhering to Greenblatt’s idea would subject
the choice made by software to the standard that governs the choices of mere
mortals behind the wheel. 205 Just as society is prepared to take advantage of
the many benefits of an automotive system that cannot text nor drink and
drive, so too will society have to accept the flaws, and sometimes
questionable decisions, of the software operators. In sum, it is incredibly
incongruent to compare apples to oranges or, in this case, software to
humans.
Critics will likely turn against the idea of further empowering NHTSA
and instead advocate for a new agency altogether to deal with AVs. While
this idea should be considered, it is not that easy. It would be incredibly costly
and time-consuming to devise an entirely new sector and team of
professionals to start from square one rather than continue to inform the
professionals currently in place of a new player in the field they already know
so much about. The same argument could have been made against
empowering the FAA with the oversight of drone regulation, but it is fair to
say that the agency has done a fine job of conforming to the rather recent
invention.
Others may picket for a stricter set of guidelines rather than the broad
safeguards suggested earlier. There are several flaws in this hasty reaction.
First, how can we impose such strict constraint to something so unknown?
NHTSA would be doing a great disservice to the evolution of technology if
it were to impose strict rules that deter companies from ever wanting to take
part in its advancement. Second, a major strength of the proposed guidelines
is that state governments and legislatures can now more effectively regulate
AVs on roads in a more personalized manner. The idea of this lenient baseline
is to supply a uniform set of rules to deal with the current absence of any
guidelines at all. Though some states have made headway by enacting rules
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and legislation concerning AVs, 206 each state widely differs from the next
thus justifying the need for NHTSA to provide a consistent baseline.
CONCLUSION
As the automotive industry progresses toward a major change in
landscape, now is the time for society to prepare for AV automation. Such
preparation includes ensuring that roadways, road signs, and drivers are wellinformed and properly equipped for such automation, and providing society
with a set of rules that directly pertain to AVs. It is equally important,
however, that NHTSA remain cognizant that while regulations are necessary,
we, as a society, are not yet familiar with AV automation, and such
regulations must be amiable and flexible as not to deter the continued global
efforts to improve this most fascinating innovation.
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